Match date: 4 July 2014

Joachim Löw changed his starting XI from the prior matches so far, with Philipp Lahm moving to right back rather than playing in central midfield and Miroslav Klose coming in as a true number 9.

For France, Didier Deschamps reverted to just Karim Benzema up top, dropping Giroud to give France more numbers in midfield. Griezmann came into the side with France looking more like a 4-3-3 on paper, but a 4-1-4-1 in the match with Germany dominating the match.

4-3-3 v 4-3-3, Space Between the Lines

Germany dominated for most of the match. The German midfield had much better balance with Schweinsteiger, Khedira, and Kroos providing defensive shape, good distribution, and dynamic movement. Kroos and Khedira were able to burst forward and find space between the French back four and midfield very easily throughout, especially Khedira. The problem for France was that they really lacked a player that is regarded as a natural holding midfielder. Pogba and Matuidi are both very dynamic midfielders, running from box to box with excellent energy, and Cabaye, though less dynamic, is also not a holding midfielder. His best times as Newcastle were when he played alongside Cheick Tiote, who was able to take the defensive responsibilities while Cabaye looked to dictate the play. So far in the World Cup, France have been able to get away with playing the three in midfield because they had been the ones dominating the matches, with their toughest opponents being Switzerland, a match they won 5-2.

Above, you can see both Özil and Müller behind the France midfield with Matuidi and Pogba working back in transition. This was common from both Özil and Müller throughout the match. When Germany won the ball deep in their own half, Özil and Müller would pinch inside, overloading Cabaye (if he was disciplined in his role) in his zone or having plenty of space to operate as they do in the image above. This wasn’t the only time that Germany were able to get into that space. When they had possession in the middle third, Khedira and Kroos were able to get in behind the French midfield, with Özil and Müller and keeping their width. Below, you can see Kroos on the back side of Pogba with the ball at Lahm’s feet.

This wasn’t the first match where Germany were able to find such spaces, but it was certainly the most pronounced and that mostly came down to the fact that Germany were playing with a true number 9 in Miroslav Klose. With Klose in, Sakho and Varane were forced to play a little deeper as Klose would usually be looking to play as close to the penalty area as possible. With someone else in that role, like Müller, the French centre backs would have been allowed to play further up the field and close the space between Cabaye and the back line, thus not allowing Germany to find the space as easily.

While Kroos and Özil got into those good positions, they were usually unable to find a final pass into Klose. The German striker rarely received the ball in the penalty area and while he was instrumental in allowing the players behind him to find space, he failed to get a shot off.

Lahm and Müller v Evra and Griezmann

Early in the match, Debuchy was France’s outlet. Özil, as we saw during his season at Arsenal, struggles when he is instructed to do defensive work. Playing on the left in this match, rather than the right, Özil was expected to help track the forward runs of Debuchy, but didn’t and the French full back was able to get forward often in the opening stages of the match. As it went on, however, Germany became aware and were able to contain his runs, especially as they began to dominate and Özil was able to push the French full back further back.

Once this happened, France began to attack down the left, through Evra and Griezmann, with Germany looking down that side as well. It made sense for France as Müller would often pinch in to help press Sakho, thus allowing Evra to get forward with relative freedom for a period and overload Lahm with Griezmann. Müller would eventually work back but Evra and Griezmann moved the ball nicely throughout the match. Lahm and Müller were able to do the same going the opposite way as well. Lahm was always looking to get forward, as he always does from a right back position Müller’s constant movement always allows space to open up for his teammates. Even if he wasn’t scoring goals consistently for the German national team, he would almost certainly still be in the side for this reason. He is one of the best in the world at creating space for teammates.

These were to two highest passing combinations in the match and they help tell the story of the match as well. You’ll notice that Lahm was able to get much further up the field before making passes to Müller than Evra was before passing the ball to Griezmann, a sign of Germany’s dominance throughout the match and a sign of France’s willingness to allow Germany to have the ball rather than attempt to press.

Changes

Throughout the match, France were essentially playing a 4-1-4-1 because of Germany’s dominance. Their best opportunities came when one of Benzema or Griezmann were able to break the high line and get int behind. A great example of this came in the 11th minute when Sakho was on the halfway line with no pressure on him. He was able to play a simple, direct ball into the run of Griezmann behind the high line of Germany. Griezmann squared the ball into the path of Benzema, only for Hummels to intercept, but it was one of France’s best opportunities.

It made sense then that when in need of a change, Deschamps brought on Loic Remy, another pacy forward, for Yohan Cabaye. Remy played on the right. The second influential change was Giroud on for Valbuena in the 85th minute which essentially gave France a 4-2-4 with Remy, Giroud, Benzema and Griezmann all as attacking options for France.

Löw didn’t introduce any defensive options to counter attack France’s forward players, but much of France’s play was trying to play long, direct balls into their forwards, which became relatively easy for Germany to defend. With Giroud on, it gave France an even more obvious target for Germany to defend and they were able to deal with any knock downs.

Conclusion

A relatively straight forward match determined by a set piece. Germany were able to dominate a French midfield that hadn’t been tested much up until that point in the tournament. Germany were able to find the space between the lines, but were really unable to find a final ball and while Klose was able to push the French centre backs towards their penalty area, thus opening up space in front of them, his on the ball influence was minimal.

France had a good tournament overall. They were unlucky to come up against a German side that has the most balanced side in the World Cup. Deschamps side played good football, but were largely untested until their match against Germany.