{"id":34,"date":"2015-05-14T04:35:44","date_gmt":"2015-05-14T04:35:44","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/motz.football\/analysis\/2015\/05\/14\/bayern-munich-v-barcelona-3-2\/"},"modified":"2017-12-08T23:28:58","modified_gmt":"2017-12-08T23:28:58","slug":"bayern-munich-v-barcelona-3-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/motz.football\/analysis\/2015\/05\/14\/bayern-munich-v-barcelona-3-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Bayern Munich v Barcelona (3-2)"},"content":{"rendered":"

Match date: 12 May 2015<\/i><\/p>\n

The first leg of this tie was incredibly exciting as both sides approached the game with the attitude of gaining control of the match itself and the tie. Barcelona came out on top of that dual after Messi took control of the game about midway through the second half and got Barcelona a 3-0 lead.<\/p>\n

Despite losing that match, Guardiola stuck with the same starting XI, but took note of the first 15 minutes of that match, starting his side with four at the back rather than three<\/p>\n

Luis Enrique also selected the same XI that beat Bayern Munich 3-0 and said in pre-match conferences that Barcelona were simply going to continue playing the same way that got them to their comfortable lead.<\/p>\n

<\/figure>\n

<\/p>\n

Bayern Munich\u2019s Shape, Right Side<\/b><\/p>\n

Guardiola arguably got his formation wrong in the first leg, at least in the opening 15 minutes. He went with an incredibly risky tactic of playing a back three against Barcelona\u2019s front three of Neymar, Suarez, and Messi. In the opening stages, the tactic backfired and Barcelona had good chances to score. After Guardiola changed his side\u2019s shape from a 3-5-2ish system to a 4-4-2 with a midfield diamond, Bayern Munich grew into the game and took control of a majority of the remaining time. With that in mind, Guardiola opted for a similar approach with both Lewandowski and\u00a0M\u00fcller up top, but there was a difference in midfield and at the back. Behind the two forwards, Guardiola opted not to play a midfield diamond and it made Bayern Munich look more like a 4-3-3 than a 4-4-2. Below is a good example of how Bayern typically looked.<\/p>\n

\"image\"<\/figure>\n

The player and role that made Bayern\u2019s shape different from that of a 4-4-2 with a diamond midfield or a 4-3-3 with two wide players and a central striker was Philipp Lahm. When Bayern Munich played with the midfield diamond in the last match against Barcelona, Lahm played on the right of the diamond. This time, however, he was not really part of the midfield, but instead looked to belong more to the forward line that had both\u00a0Lewandowski and M\u00fcller in central positions. Most of the time, Lahm\u2019s positioning was very high and very wide. There could have been a few reasons for this. Guardiola could have wanted to restrict the amount of space that Alba was allowed to get going forward, as both he and Alves had plenty of room in the first leg, and so Guardiola pushed one of the world\u2019s best defenders further up the pitch to keep Alba pinned back. Another reason could have been that Guardiola wanted Lahm to be Bayern\u2019s main outlet going forward so that he could deliver good crosses into\u00a0Lewandowski and M\u00fcller. However, the answer probably lies somewhere between the two. Being one of the best defenders in the world, Guardiola certainly wanted Lahm to be high up the field, helping lead the press with\u00a0Lewandowski and M\u00fcller so that Bayern could win the ball back quickly and then wanted the Bayern Munich captain to play intelligent balls into the two forwards. In the end, however, Lahm was on the fringes of the match during his time on the pitch and it was unsurprising to see him subbed off first.<\/p>\n

With that said, it was clear that Bayern Munich had a plan to attack down the right. Lahm was deployed in a high right role, Thiago, the most creative player on the pitch for Bayern, was playing on the right side of the midfield three,\u00a0M\u00fcller drifted to the right throughout the match, and Boateng was played as the right centre back, something that he hasn\u2019t done when partnered with Benatia in past games.<\/p>\n

\"image\"<\/figure>\n

The intent started from the back with Boateng playing on the right side of the two centre backs. Boateng is much better at playing the ball out of the back and with the possibility to Barcelona closing down Xabi Alonso and playing with a high press, it was important that Guardiola have a player that can bypass the midfield with accurate passes from a deep position, thus Boateng played on the right. The next line saw Thiago on the right with the former Barcelona player being Bayern\u2019s spark in midfield, and then was Lahm\u2019s high positioning. Thiago did an excellent job finding space between the lines and was able to pick the ball up numerous times and run at the Barcelona back line with the Barcelona midfield trying to eliminate the passing lanes into the likes of Thiago rather than eliminate the space that they could play in.<\/p>\n

It worked relatively well for Bayern as they created a good number of chances from the right. When they were unable to break down the Barcelona lines, however, they looked to play down the left through Bernat, who had a huge amount of space to run when the ball was switched as Messi stayed high for most of the match and the Barcelona midfield shifted over to become very narrow.<\/p>\n

Alonso, Bayern\u2019s Press and Poor Defending<\/b><\/p>\n

For much of the match, Bayern would transition into a back three when Xabi Alonso dropped from midfield. He did so regularly and it benefitted Bayern for the most part when they had the ball, but, like with the first Barcelona goal, he was sometimes deeper than the Bayern Munich centre backs and it caused the home side problems. In that case, it kept Suarez onside. Further up the field though, Alonso looked to cut off passing lanes into Messi, something he did similarly in an El Clasico under Mourinho where he tracked Messi the whole match. He was not actively seeking out Messi in this match though, only doing so when the Argentine drifted into the middle of the pitch. Otherwise, Alonso stepped to Iniesta and tried to limit the amount of influence that the Barcelona man had on the match and was relatively successful in doing so.<\/p>\n

\"image\"<\/figure>\n

Bayern Munich\u2019s press was effective for much of the match. They were not really winning the ball high up the pitch, but instead put enough pressure on the likes of Pique and Mascherano to force passes into midfield. At that point, Bayern would press very intensely to win the ball back. Thiago and Schweinsteiger, in particular, were quick to read the cues and put immediate pressure on the Barcelona receiver and Bayern were able to launch good counter attacks because of this pressing. The pressing also forced Barcelona to hit long balls into Suarez, Messi, and Neymar, with Barcelona\u2019s second goal being a good example of the good and bad of Bayern\u2019s high pressing. Lahm pressed Mascherano well with the Barcelona centre back inside his own penalty area, but he played a long pass to Messi in the centre circle and it drew Benatia forward, who was hoping to win the header, but Messi was able to flick it on to Suarez, who squared to Neymar to make it 2-1 on the night.<\/p>\n

\"image\"<\/figure>\n

So while Bayern forced Barcelona to play long with their pressing, it caught Bayern out just the same.<\/p>\n

Enrique Allows Bayern Back In<\/b><\/p>\n

As mentioned above, Bayern\u2019s pressing forced Barcelona to play long and it became an effective tactic for the Spanish side as Suarez was always looking to find space as an option for a long ball and was always willing to chase down the much more hopeful balls from the Barcelona players. However, at half time, Luis Enrique opted to replace Suarez with Pedro which meant that Messi was now playing through the middle. Not only did Suarez offer Barcelona an option for a long ball, something that Messi did not do as he dropped into midfield more often than making runs in behind, Suarez was also much more keen to press with Boateng and Benatia had the ball. Without Suarez up top, Barcelona had no outlet to try to bypass the Bayern Munich press, making the German side\u2019s pressing more effective, and also did not have a player that was going to help Bayern Munich from playing out of the back.<\/p>\n

\"image\"<\/figure>\n

This is not to say that Barcelona were in control of the match before half time and the substitution. Barcelona\u2019s two goals were fortunate in that Bayern\u2019s defense was caught out and Barcelona were clinical in their chances. Bayern were much the better side in both halves, but they were able to put even more pressure on Barcelona, and score two goals, after Barcelona were forced to try to play out of the back a bit more often rather than play long balls up to Suarez.<\/p>\n

After Lewandowski\u2019s well taken goal, Guardiola subbed off Lahm for Rode which changed Bayern Munich from that 4-3-3ish shape to a 4-4-2 with a diamond midfield. Alonso played at the base, Thiago played on the left, Rode played on the right, and Schweinsteiger played behind Lewandowski and\u00a0M\u00fcller, with the latter scoring soon after that change.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/b><\/p>\n

On the night, Bayern Munich were the better team and it was reflected in the scoreline. They had eight shots on target and forced Ter Stegen into some very good saves including a clearance off the line from a Lewandowski shot. It\u2019s easy to say that had Bayern\u2019s defending been better in this match, they could have been the team going through to the final, but that\u2019s hypothetical and outside of the context of the match.<\/p>\n

The two sides produced another entertaining match for neutrals, however, and the result could have looked very different had Bayern Munich and Guardiola had all their players fit like Barcelona did.<\/p>\n

Luis Enrique brings Barcelona to their first final in four years and the parallels between Guardiola\u2019s first season at Barcelona and Enrique\u2019s first season are there to be seen.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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