Match date: 20 September 2015

Borussia Dortmund have had an excellent start under Thomas Tuchel, coming into the match having played ten matches and winning all ten. The Dortmund players have spoken about how refreshing Tuchel is and how attentive to detail he is, as well as how tactically sound the German coach is. While Dortmund have started brilliantly, Leverkusen have struggled a bit to recapture their good form of last season.

This is Borussia Dortmund’s first ‘big’ test under Tuchel. Bayer Leverkusen have been excellent under Roger Schmidt, so it was always going to be a good match. Tuchel continued with a 4-2-3-1 / 4-1-4-1 and had his strongest XI on the field, excluding Marco Reus who was only fit enough for the bench with a toe injury.

Bayer Leverkusen and Roger Schmidt started in a 4-4-2 with the newest signing, Javier Hernandez, up top with Stefan Kiessling.

Leverkusen’s Press, Hummels

So far under Thomas Tuchel, Gündoğan and Weigl have been incredibly important to Dortmund’s play. When Borussia Dortmund played Monchengladbach, Gündoğan’s display seemed to capture a lot of what Tuchel wanted his side to look like. Since that 4-0 win, Dortmund have continued in good form and continue to impress with the performances behind the good results. Up against Leverkusen, however, they had their biggest test. This is not really because Leverkusen are a ‘big club’ in Germany or because they did well last year compared to Dortmund, but rather because of Roger Schmidt’s tactics. He enjoys a high-tempo match with his sides continuously pressing high up the pitch while Dortmund like to control the ball (as good Bayern Munich though and Leverkusen lost that match 3-0) and will look to play out of the back through Leverkusen’s pressing.

The opening minutes of the match saw Hummels and Sokratis exchanging passes. Leverkusen were high up the pitch in a 4-4-2, but neither striker was putting pressure on the Dortmund centre backs, instead, they were cutting off the passing lanes into Gündoğan and Weigl. Calhanoglu and Bellarabi were both narrow as well, again, hoping to cut off the forward passing lanes from Sokratis and Hummels, in particular. The German centre back is one of the best ball-playing centre backs in the game, so if Leverkusen and Schmidt were going to cut off the passes to Gündoğan and Weigl, they had to ensure that Hummels did not have any forward options. Below you can see a screen capture from early in the match with Sokratis on the ball. Notice the positioning of the Leverkusen strikers and wide players as they cut off those passes in the Dortmund centre midfielders.

This approach from Leverkusen worked to an extent as Gündoğan and Weigl and struggled to get on the ball less than they typically would, although because of the high percentage of Dortmund’s possession in the match, they still saw plenty of the ball. In the above screen capture, you can see where Weigl wants to be receiving the ball; between the first and second lines of Leverkusen’s pressing. Early on, however, Leverkusen’s positioning forced Hummels and Sokratis to play the ball into their respective full backs; a forward pass, but not really breaking Leverkusen’s pressing lines and because of that were not that threatening, rather than getting the ball into Weigl.

Even when Dortmund’s midfielders were getting on the ball, a Leverkusen player was usually touch tight to them, forcing the ball back to Hummels and Sokratis. With Leverkusen suffocating passes into Gündoğan and Weigl, Dortmund had to work the ball to Kagawa and Aubameyang another way and so Hummels became the deep-lying playmaker of sorts that Gündoğan was in that 4-0 win over Borussia Monchengladbach. However, for Hummels to get the ball through the Leverkusen midfield, it meant that Gündoğan and Weigl had to be clever in their movement. The Dortmund duo had to drift apart to drag the Leverkusen players with them and create a passing lane for Hummels to play forward. The outward movement of Gündoğan and Weigl was a trigger for Aubameyang to come checking in for a pass from Hummels, likewise with Hummels to Kagawa. The first good Dortmund attack came from this scenario. Bellarabi left his position to press Hummels, Weigl began moving into the half space with Javier Hernandez following him, and Aubameyang checked into the centre passing lane that was created. A few passes later, Jonas Hofmann had a good chance. Below is a screen capture of Hummels’ ball bypassing the Dortmund midfield as well as Leverkusen’s first two lines of pressure.

For the first half, Kagawa and Aubameyang were the target players for Dortmund. Gündoğan and Weigl were responsible for creating the passing lanes into the more advanced two and Hummels had to play the pass. There were times when Kagawa would move into the wide areas, again, triggered by the movement of Gündoğan and Weigl in the midfield. In the match, Hummels made ten passes to Kagawa and Aubameyang, nine of which came in the first half as Dortmund bypassed the midfield and Leverkusen’s press.

Dortmund Going Forward

During Dortmund’s build up play, Gündoğan and Weigl were usually on the same receiving line, but when the home side were able to break Leverkusen’s press, Dortmund’s shape was more of a 4-1-4-1 than a 4-2-3-1 with Gündoğan moving forward to be in line with Kagawa. Mkhitaryan and Hofmann would typically drift in and out of the half spaces laterally, opening up space either centrally for Kagawa and Gündoğan to operate or in the wide areas for Ginter and Schmelzer to get forward, or they would push further forward in line with Aubameyang. Weigl was almost always available when Dortmund were in Leverkusen’s half as the home side had a man advantage in the centre of the pitch. Weigl’s positioning allowed the home side to move the ball more freely as Leverkusen defended in a 4-4-2 for most of the match, although looked like a 4-2-3-1 at times in the second half. Below is an example of Dortmund’s shape when in possession in Leverkusen’s half, in particular focusing on the midfield triangle’s shape.

The particular phase above came after Dortmund had overloaded the left side of the pitch, which they look to do often under Tuchel. Aubameyang, Kagawa, and Mkhitaryan had all drifted over while Hofmann took up a central striker role. Dortmund overloaded the left constantly throughout the match, opening up the right side for a quick switch, but the combination play on the left, through the half space and centrally, particularly between Kagawa and Mkhitaryan, was excellent and dragged the Leverkusen back line out of their shape consistently.

A year ago, Mkhitaryan was looking down and out at Dortmund. He struggled to find the form that earned him a move from Shakhtar Donetsk, but under Tuchel, he has looked fantastic. As mentioned above, Mkhitaryan’s movement through the half space on the left was fantastic. He would drift inside and his combination play with Kagawa, Aubameyang, and Schmelzer was excellent. The Armenian international was excellent with the ball at his feet as well. He would pick up the ball in the left half space and go on diagonal runs with the ball, evading defenders, while creating space for his teammates. It was not as explosive as Messi’s runs, but against Leverkusen, it was just as effective in getting away from defenders and creating space.

Schmidt’s Changes

At halftime, Schmidt took off Kiessling and Kramer. Neither performed particularly well. Kiessling was unable to really help Javier Hernandez press either Hummels or Sokratis and the German striker was unable to keep up with the movement of the ball to take away the central passing lanes. He was also meant to be an aerial outlet for Leverkusen when Dortmund pressed, but he struggled to win his duals against Sokratis and Hummels. With that, it made sense for Schmidt to replace him with a more energetic forward option in Julian Brandt. The thought behind the youngster’s introduction was to allow more pressing, but also an another counter attacking option. With Brandt, Bellarabi partnered Hernandez up top.

Schmidt also brought Mehmedi on at halftime for Kramer. This moved Calhanoglu into the middle with Kampl, which gave Leverkusen an energetic midfield duo, but meant they lacked some a real ball winner in the centre of the pitch.

Conclusion

Tuchel’s side got the best of Leverkusen in every part of the match. While Leverkusen’s pressing seemed difficult to break down at times, Dortmund were able to adjust in order to break the lines. With this win, it gives Dortmund 11 wins in 11 matches under Tuchel. The movement of the midfield was key to opening up Leverkusen and going forward, Dortmund’s combination play was too much for Leverkusen.

Schmidt has struggled to find the form of last year and now has just six points from their opening five matches. Tuchel tactically got much the better of Schmidt with the latter never really adjusting his side once Dortmund were able to pass through the midfield.