Match date: 12 September 2015

The third matchday of La Liga sees the last two winners of the league come face to face. Barcelona won this fixture last year, clinching the title in the process. While Barcelona looks very much like they did last year in terms of personnel, Atletico Madrid had a busy summer. The capital side sold a number of starters from last season as Arda Turan moved to Barcelona, Mario Mandzukic went to Juventus, Raul Garcia was sold to Athletic Bilbao, and Mario Suarez left for Fiorentina. Jackson Martinez, Savic, Yannick Ferreira Carrasco, and Vietto all made big money moves to Atletico Madrid.

Simeone started the match in a 4-4-2 with Torres and Griezmann up top, with new signings Martinez and Vietto on the bench. Koke, Gabi, Tiago, and Oliver Torres played in midfield while Juanfran, Gimenez, Godin, and Filipe Luis (who was bought back from Chelsea) started in the back four.

Luis Enrique made a big call prior to the match to not start Messi, who was away with the birth of his second child. In his place, Rafinha started on the right side of a 4-3-3. Thomas Vermaelen started at centre back alongside Mascherano while Ter Stegen made his La Liga debut.

Atletico’s Pressing and Narrow Midfield

In the matches where Simeone and Atletico Madrid have found success against Barcelona, pressing has been a huge part of Atletico’s approach. In this match, however, Atletico’s pressing came in short waves rather than the fervent and persistent pressure that worked well for them against Barcelona, particularly when the home side won La Liga and reached the Champions League final. Torres and Griezmann started up top and while they put Mascherano and Vermaelen under pressure a few times in the first half, Atletico were not too concerned with the ball playing of either centre back. There were times when one of Torres or Greizmann would pressure either centre back and a few times they were able to win the ball, with one time leading to an opportunity for Torres. When one of the Atletico strikers pressed the centre back in possession, they other would rotate onto Busquets, which meant the defender under pressure had a square pass to play, but it kept the ball on the same line, which was what Atletico Madrid would have wanted. Below is an early example of this.

As mentioned, however, Atletico Madrid looked more content defending in a midblock, 4-4-2 shape throughout the first half. This, too, is not a new tactic used by Atletico Madrid, especially not against Barcelona. With a narrow midfield, Atletico look to cut off any passing lanes through the middle of the pitch, allowing the opposition to play out wide before pressing the ball again. Below is a good example of this. Mascherano is on the ball, Atletico Madrid are defending with all their players behind the ball and a narrow midfield, which forces the pass out to Sergi Roberto, who is immediately pressured by Koke.

As a result of their midfield shape, Atletico were certainly able to force Barcelona into the wide areas. Any intricate movements through the middle while Barcelona were building their play were easy to cut out for Atletico. The only real ball on for Barcelona through the middle were direct balls into Suarez, which had a fairly low chance of success as he was isolated against Godin and Gimenez while Barcelona were building from the back. While the plan to force Barcelona wide worked, it was after this that the capital side struggled to deal with Barcelona’s play. Jordi Alba and Sergi Roberto saw so much of the ball early on and Barcelona were able to play off of them.

Barcelona’s Outside-In Attack

As mentioned above, Atletico dictated the spaces that Barcelona were able to build their attacks and forced them into the wide areas and the feet of Jordi Alba and Sergi Roberto. Typically, Barcelona enjoy building through the middle of the pitch and particularly starting attacks through Busquets, but Atletico limited the amount of the ball that the holding midfield saw. However, Barcelona were able to adapt quickly the ball moving wide more often than not with the movement of Neymar, Iniesta, Rafinha, Rakitic, and Suarez freeing up one another to get into central passing lanes for the two fullbacks. One of the best examples of this was in the build up that pass from Iniesta to Rakitic. Alba received a diagonal ball, played it to Iniesta, and the Barcelona captain dribbled across the Atletico back line (a bit like Messi) before playing a ball into Rakitic’s path. This was common movement from Barcelona players; they knew the ball was being played out to their fullbacks so their movement was triggered by Atletico’s own pressing.

Rafinha and Neymar occupied their respective fullbacks while Iniesta and Rakitic worked on getting the ball from Alba and Roberto in the half spaces on either side of the pitch. Once one of the Barcelona attackers got on the ball, their link up play through the middle was to be expected as Atletico’s flat midfield four were too slow to limit the space between the lines at times.

Despite Barcelona’s adaption, they still struggled to really break down Atletico Madrid’s defensive shape and create clear cut chances.

Changes, Messi Magic

At halftime, Simeone altered his plans, changing from a 4-4-2 to a 4-3-¾-5-1. This gave Atletico Madrid more control in the wide areas as now there were more bodies across the midfield so that Oliver Torres and Griezmann, now playing on the right side of midfield rather than partnering Fernando Torres, were able to track the runs of Sergi Roberto and Jordi Alba. It worked well for the home side as well and they were early on they were able to get a goal, though it was not necessarily due to the formation change. One of the negatives of the change was that there was now little hurry for Mascherano and Mathieu (who came on for Vermaelen) to play quickly into the wide areas. Against one striker, they were able to build their attacks with much more patience and this began to push Atletico Madrid further back which, in turn, made their counter attacking threat a bit more sterile. This was also a reason why Jackson Martinez was brought on. Though he rarely saw the ball, he theoretically gave Atletico Madrid more of a presence up top to hold the ball up for his teammates to support him than Torres was able to when the home side were pinned back.

At the point when Messi came on for Barcelona, the match was already in Barcelona’s favour, and Luis Enrique’s tactical shift from a 4-3-3 to a 4-4-2 with a diamond midfield and Messi at the top of it, allowed Barcelona to go on and win the match. With the diamond midfield, Barcelona were able to outnumber Atletico Madrid in the centre of the pitch, especially during build up play. As mentioned, Atletico Madrid were dropping deeper and deeper in the second half so Busquets, Iniesta, and Rafinha, the bottom three of the diamond, were typically able to move the ball quickly forward with just Jackson Martinez applying pressure. As the Barcelona trio moved forward, Atletico Madrid had to apply pressure, but being outnumbered, one of the four midfielders was going to find space to get on the ball and Messi did it best. The Argentine was outstanding during his time on the pitch. He was able to stay in a central area just behind Neymar and Suarez and was able to shift around the Atletico Madrid defenders with quick, short passing and drew defenders in with his dribbling while also breaking the lines. This allowed space to open up for Neymar and Suarez to make direct runs off the ball. In the 30 minutes he was on, Messi completed eight take-ons, five more than the next closest players. Below you can see Barcelona with their diamond midfield and the space where Messi did most of his best work on the night, combining well with Suarez and Neymar.

While we can call the shape of Barcelona a 4-4-2 with a diamond midfield, Neymar stayed toward the left rather than playing closer to Suarez as two forwards traditionally would when partnered. Messi never really drifted to the right, the key was to overload the left side of the pitch, the left half space, and it is of no coincidence that Messi’s winning goal came from possession in that area of the pitch, winning it back quickly in that area, and then the quick combination. Sergi Roberto maintained balance on the right, but he was used far less frequently when Messi came on.

Conclusion

Simeone’s tactics coming into the match were fairly straight forward as he identified Alba and Roberto as the weak points in the Barcelona side, thus getting those two the ball as much as possible limited Barcelona’s chances going forward. However, Barcelona adapted well as Iniesta and more Rafinha than Rakitic on the right were able to move well to get the ball from the fullbacks and carry the ball forward for Barcelona. Iniesta was excellent throughout the match, but Messi was the game changer as he added a huge spark for Barcelona’s sometimes dull attack.