Match date: 10 December 2014

Paris Saint Germain won the last outing between the two sides and sat at the top of the group coming into the match, meaning Barcelona would have to win or chance facing the likes of Bayern Munich, Chelsea, Juventus, or any other group winner in the knockout round and they hadn’t done that since the 2006-2007 campaign.

With that in mind, Luis Enrique decided to change from a 4-3-3, which he has set his side out in for much of the season, and deploy a 3-3-1-3, with Messi as the ‘1’ behind a front three of Neymar, Suarez, and Pedro.

Blanc selected the personnel for a 4-3-3, although much of the time they looked like a very flat and rigid 4-4-2 as much of their match was spent defending against Barcelona’s possession.

3-3-1-3 v 4-4-2

It was certainly adventurous by Enrique to name a 3-3-1-3, but Paris Saint Germain’s defensive shape showed that Laurent Blanc was not expecting such a change from Enrique and it allowed Barcelona’s new shape to thoroughly excel.

Barcelona had advantages all over the field. At the back, they had a numerical advantage against Paris Saint Germain with Bartra, Pique, and Mathieu against Ibrahimovic and Cavani. It also gave Barcelona an advantage in midfield, with Iniesta and Busquets in front of Mascherano in Barcelona’s three against Verratti and Thiago Motta. At times, Matuidi, who mostly plays in central midfield for Paris Saint Germain, came inside and allowed his side to play with equal numbers, but this allowed Bartra to get up the field and provide some deep width when Barcelona needed to recycle the ball.

The issues for Paris Saint Germain came when they defended in their 4-4-2. The rigidness that a flat 4-4-2 has allows for spaces between the lines to open up and so they did against Barcelona. In his role behind the front three, Messi was allowed to find plenty of space behind Verratti and Motta and in front of David Luiz and Thiago Silva, who were occupied with the constant movement of Luis Suarez. Below is a good example of the space that Messi consistently found himself occupying and the movement of Suarez to occupy the centre backs. Remember, the amount of space Messi needs to operate is relatively small and this perhaps the smallest amount of space he had on the night.

Messi drifted into this space just before his goal, which allowed him a free run into the box when Suarez knocked the ball across the six yard box for the Argentine to score. Throughout the match, Messi drifted into different pockets of space that Paris Saint Germain’s 4-4-2 left open.

When Paris Saint Germain were defending in their midblock 4-4-2, it was hard for them to work their way out when they won the ball back, regardless of where they won it back. Barcelona’s pressing was hugely effective at times, which helped pin Paris Saint Germain back and when the French side looked at their best, it was because Barcelona’s pressing had eased, but the problem for Paris Saint Germain were the numerical advantages that Barcelona had all over the pitch and the width of Pedro and Neymar forced Maxwell and van der Wiel back. Below is a perfect example of just that. It’s very early on in the match and Neymar and Pedro are both on their respective touchlines, forcing Paris Saint Germain’s full backs to maintain their deep position and watch for diagonal switches to the wide players.

Paris Saint Germain Use Their Width

Continuing with the above section, the wide areas were also the area of the pitch where Paris Saint Germain found their most success, especially through Lucas on the right. In a 3-3-1-3, the first two lines of ‘3’ are both narrow. The centre backs are close together, especially when against two forwards, to allow the middle of three to have freedom to move. This allows the wide areas to open up and against a 4-4-2, this becomes an issue. Lucas was able to pick up the ball in a lot of space throughout the match and run at Mathieu, which caused chaos for Barcelona on a number of occasions. Paris Saint Germain’s goal came from a right sided cross as well. Not only was Lucas an issue, but van der Wiel was as well due to Neymar’s high position and his selective work rate. Below shows the space that Paris Saint Germain had to attack in the wide areas.

Far too many times Lucas was able to get on the ball and run at Mathieu in a 1v1 situation. Pique would typically come across to provide cover, but this of course allowed Ibrahimovic and Cavani to make runs into the box marked by just Bartra and a recovering midfielder, usually Mascherano. These situations came when Paris Saint Germain were able to win the ball in midfield, allowing for a quick counter attack. Otherwise, Barcelona looked relatively comfortable, which will be mentioned later.

Mascherano and the Back Four

The space that Paris Saint Germain left open for Messi was mentioned earlier in the analysis, but the other area of the pitch that PSG failed to cover effectively was in front of Barcelona’s back three; the space that Mascherano was able to move around in relatively free and was arguably the most important player on the field for the Spanish side.

In the free space that Mascherano found, he was able to dictate play and recycle the ball, as a defensive midfielder typically does, but his passing was also exceptionally. His most notable pass on the night was an excellent ball behind Paris Saint Germain’s back four to Suarez for Messi’s goal, but his good diagonals out to Neymar and Pedro shifted the PSG defense well.

Equally important to his contributions going forward was his defensive role. As a defensive midfielder, he broke up play well and covered the midfield pressure of Iniesta and Busquets well. However, the best bit was him dropping into the back four between Pique and Mathieu. He typically do this when Barcelona were not pressing and when Paris Saint Germain were able to slowly build from the back. This allowed Mathieu and Bartra to play a bit wider and take away PSG’s opportunities in the wide areas. This made PSG rely on counter attacks started higher up the pitch as it was only then that they would be able to engage Mascherano and find space out wide.

Conclusion

As the match went on, and Barcelona had their 2-1 lead, Enrique reverted to a 4-3-3 with Rakitic and Xavi on for Pedro and Iniesta. This allowed Barcelona more stability at the back and kept their numerical advantage in centre midfield.

Blanc’s changes, the first which was Pastore on for Verratti, came only after Barcelona had the lead. Pastore was tidy, but had very little impact on the match while Lavezzi’s introduction left PSG more open and just minutes later, Barcelona scored their third.

It will be interesting to see if Enrique continues with a 3-3-1-3 or whether it was simply an experiment that their qualification could allow for.