Match date: 23 August 2014
Dortmund finished in second place last year, 19 points behind champions Bayern Munich. Leverkusen finished fourth by the end of the season, but had occupied second and third place for a large majority of the season. When things started turn, Sami Hyypia was fired and Lewandowski was appointed as interim. This summer, Leverkusen appointed Roger Schmidt, formerly of Red Bull Salzburg.
Dortmund lost Robert Lewandowski earlier this summer on a free transfer to Bayern Munich, but have brought in Ciro Immobile from Torino to play up top. Young centre back Matthias Ginter, Adrian Ramos, and a permanent move for Nuri Sahin are some others that have joined Klopp’s squad.
Schmidt was appointed 1 July and Leverkusen have made a number of moves, including the signing of Hakan Calhanoglu from HSV.
Leverkusen’s Pressing and Shape, Attacks
Leverkusen were 1-0 after just seven seconds as they scored after just a few passes from kick off. It is the quickest goal in Bundesliga history and it came from a manager that looks to play high energy, direct football, both in possession and out of possession. Schmidt came to Leverkusen after impressing so many with his philosophy and system at Red Bull Salzburg last season. The Austrian side scored 110 goals in 36 domestic league matches and won the Austrian Bundesliga by 18 points. It wasn’t just their domestic triumphs, however, as they knocked Ajax out of the Europa League with a 6-1 aggregate score.
With a 1-0 scoreline after seven seconds, many managers on the winning team would take a slightly cautious approach to the rest of the game. They know that there is still a whole game left to be played, but plans to press and get as many numbers forward would usually make way for a more controlled approach, which, depending on the manager, would mean a possession based control or space based control. For Schmidt and Leverkusen, it doesn’t seem that the plans were altered too much. Knowing for his high energy system, Schmidt urged his side to press Dortmund whenever they had the ball, just as planned.
Kiessling led Leverkusen’s pressing as he would press the centre back in possession of the ball, with, usually Calhanoglu, waiting for a pass from Kiessling’s centre back to the other centre back before pressing the receiving player. There was a great amount of fluidity from Leverkusen’s front four, however, with all leading the press at one time. If the ball was played out to a full back, it would mean, usually, Son or Bellarabi would close down the full back quickly with the entire team shifting over. The most important aspect of Schmidt and Leverkusen’s pressing is the horizontal and vertical compactness of the side, gegenpressing. Dortmund and Pep’s Barcelona have been the best sides in the world in the last few years when it comes to pressing and Schmidt’s system is certainly on par with both. Below, you can see Leverkusen transitioning to a ball being received out wide by Aubameyang.
The shape that Leverkusen is incredibly important to their pressing. It is something of a 4-4-2/4-2-2-2/4-2-4, depending on the phase of play and where the ball is. Perhaps the most important players, however, are Son and Bellarabi, who position themselves as inside forwards, behind Kiessling and Calhanoglu, in the half spaces. This allows them to aid in pressing in the wide areas or central quickly. Below is a picture in which Son and Bellarabi are a bit more inside and where Leverkusen look more like a 4-2-2-2.
Against Dortmund, Leverkusen were more successful in the wide areas, because of the Leverkusen midfield and Son and Bellarabi cutting off the passing lanes to centre midfield. With Dortmund in their 4-4-2, with a diamond midfield, it meant that they had strength in the middle. By cutting off the passing lanes, Leverkusen could dictate the passing to the wide areas and then trap Dortmund. Below, you can see the location of Leverkusen’s tackles and interceptions; high up the pitch or in the wide areas. The compactness of the side allows Leverkusen’s forward players to win the ball high up the pitch, especially when transitioning into a 4-2-4, with Son and Bellarabi supporting Kiessling and Calhanoglu’s pressing.
Just like in their pressing, Leverkusen are high energy when they have the ball, with little focus on keeping it and looking for the quickest way to creating chances. Because of this Leverkusen had just 42% possession against Dortmund and completed just 60% of their passes, but caused Dortmund problems with their quick movements. The first goal was scored from kick off, through a fast moving, direct combination. In this respect, Schmidt’s philosophy is similar to the likes of Bielsa and Pochettino, who like their sides to move the ball vertically as quickly as possible. With their vertical play, if they lose the ball high up the pitch, it simply allows them to press the opposition close to their own goal. The second goal was a combination of the vertical play and pressing. Toprak played an errant forward pass that was picked up by Durm, but Bellarabi pressed incredibly well, won the ball back, and played Kiessling in for the second goal in the 94th minute.
Dortmund’s 1st Half v 2nd Half
No manager expects their team to be 1-0 after seven seconds, but that was reality that Dortmund were up against and it was against a side that, as noted above, pressed them tirelessly. In the first half, Dortmund looked incredibly uncomfortable with the ball and out of ideas with the way Leverkusen were pressing. It forced Klopp’s side to play the ball long more often than not, which hardly suits Immobile or Aubameyang. Unfortunately for Dortmund, it was a situation that Lewandowski would have helped in; battling for aerial balls, while Hummels’ distribution from the back would have been much more effective than Sokratis’ and Ginter’s.
Dortmund looked out of ideas until half time and had just one shot on target in the opening 45 minutes. However, as the second half went on, Dortmund began to breakdown Leverkusen a bit easier. During the first half, Dortmund played in their new diamond 4-4-2, with Kehl as the holding midfielder, Mkhitaryan and Jojic on the sides, and Reus through the middle. This allowed Leverkusen to dictate where Dortmund could play by cutting off the passing lanes to the midfield as noted above. In the second half, however, Dortmund were able to combine much quicker around Leverkusen’s pressing because they made the field much wider, especially down the right as Aubameyang shifted to a wider position, rather than up top next for Immobile. While Leverkusen like to remain compact both vertically and horizontally, Dortmund began using the wide areas and switching the ball quicker, which forced Leverkusen to cover more ground and opened up more holes for the likes of Reus and Mkhitaryan to exploit. You can notice the difference in approach from Dortmund simply in the passing diagram below. Notice the increased focus on the wide areas in the second half compared to the first.
Conclusion
Leverkusen had a good campaign last year and will certainly be looking to build upon it this year. Schmidt’s high energy pressing and direct play looks to suit Leverkusen well and it will be interesting to see how they progress throughout the season, especially against Bayern Munich and against a full strength Dortmund.
Klopp was without a number of players that would have been in the starting XI if fully fit, including Weidenfeller, Subotic, Hummels, Sahin, Gundogan, and Bender. Dortmund were certainly not at their best, but showed signs of improvement in the second half against a good Leverkusen side.