Match date: 13 July 2014

The semifinal matches leading up to the World Cup final were complete contrasts of one another. Germany made easy work of Brazil in their semifinal match, winning 7-1, while Argentina had to take it to penalties in their semifinal match against Netherlands. It wasn’t just the scorelines though, as the performance of Argentina was just enough to get them to the final.

Joachim Löw was forced to make a change just prior to kick off, with Sami Khedira picking up a calf injury in warm ups. Rather than moving Philipp Lahm back into midfield, where he played at the start of the tournament, Löw opted to start Christoph Kramer in central midfield. It was only the Borussia Monchengladbach midfielder’s second international start. It was the only change to the starting XI from the side that beat Brazil, but looked more like a 4-2-3-1, especially after Kramer’s substitution.

Argentina remained unchanged from the side that beat the Netherlands and, as the game went on, they looked more like a 4-4-1-1 rather than a 4-3-3.

Germany Control, Attack the Right

The opening stages of the match saw both sides getting forward and it made for a very open match, but that soon slowed down and Germany asserted control of the match, forcing Argentina deep and to play on the counter attack. Germany’s midfield began to settle the ball down well once Argentina began to sit back and defend in a 4-4-1-1, with Lavezzi and Perez as the outside midfielders. players dropped quickly and Argentina kept a narrow midfield, trying to limit the influence of Kroos and Özil, who continually went pinched inside before finally playing through the middle when Kramer was taken off. While Germany looked incredibly dangerous down the right against Brazil, their best attacks throughout the tournament came when Toni Kroos and Sami Khedira were able to get forward and find space between the lines. Their positioning allowed Germany to play quick, vertical passes which saw Germany become the tournament’s top scorers.

Above, you can see that  Argentina were successful in eliminating that space, however, mostly because they played so deep, so their defensive line and midfield were relatively close. Mascherano played a key part in Argentina’s defensive shape throughout the tournament and here you can see him shifting to the ball side to eliminate the space behind Perez’s imminent pressing. If Kroos and Kramer/Özil were able to get in between the lines, they were mostly unable to get the ball as Argentina were so compact, with Lavezzi and Perez pinching in, that the passing lanes were shut off, much like Atletico Madrid.

This, however, allowed the wide areas to become very open for Germany to attack, which is where they found a good amount of their success. Look at the screen capture from above and you can see both Lahm, who is about to receive the ball, and Höwedes both relatively unmarked because of the compactness of Argentina’s midfield. Höwedes is a right-footed centre back at his club, Schalke, in Germany and so he isn’t used to getting forward in attack, especially in wide areas. On the right, however, Philipp Lahm is arguably the world’s best right back and his combination play with Müller throughout the tournament (when he’s played at right back) has been very good. They were able to overload Rojo, who tried to get forward as much as possible, on quick switches with Perez so narrow and having to shift.

Those quick switches mostly came from Toni Kroos, who looked to play long diagonals over to Philipp Lahm, as he was, again, mostly free when the ball was on the opposite side of the pitch. Below, you can Kroos’ passes played. While most of them were played to the left side of the pitch, the side he usually positioned himself on, you can see his longest passes were played out to right, to Philipp Lahm, on those quick, diagonal switches.

At the beginning of the tournament, Schweinsteiger was on the bench, nursing an injury. He came back, with Philipp Lahm moving to right back, and performed well up until the final, where he had his best game in the tournament. He was able to dictate play for Germany very well, completing the most passes. He had so much space to operate in, as Argentina’s midfield was intent on staying compact and Messi was very lack in his pressure. Below is a good example of Argentina allowing Schweinsteiger to have the ball and Messi putting no pressure on him, which let him play the ball forward with ease.

Hummels and Boateng, High German Line

Germany’s high line squeezed the midfield when Argentina were in possession of the ball and allowed the midfielders and forward players of Germany to press Argentina’s back four and Mascherano when they won possession deep in their half and attempted to play out of the back. Below is a good example of their pressing when they lost the ball high up the pitch. Pressing here allows Germany to win the ball back higher up the field, but also did not allow Argentina to play quick balls up to Messi, Lavezzi, and Higuain in the channels as they looked to do against the Netherlands.

It did just that as well. Argentina were unable to exploit Germany’s high line with simple balls over the top; they tried, but were unsuccessful most of the time.

Hummels was beaten for pace just one time, when Messi was able to dribble past him, get a ball into the six yard box past Neuer, and cause a nervy moment for Germany, but aside from this, Argentina never really looked to exploit Hummels’ lack of pace. The best part of of Germany’s high line, however, was that it allowed Hummels and Boateng to step into midfield and in front of Messi and Higuain and Aguero and Palacio when they were on. Their second half performance in this regard was fantastic, with a lot of credit due to the change in shape by Argentina, and allowed Germany to continue putting consistent pressure on Argentina’s midfield and back four.

Argentina Down the Right, Chances

Against Netherlands, Argentina found their best chances come about from the right side of their attack. Martins Indi got far too tight when marking and was turned easy and Daley Blind thought he could get up the field without leaving Martins Indi exposed, but that wasn’t the case. Lavezzi and Messi were able to overrun the young centre back and that, along with a yellow card, forced van Gaal to take him off at half time. In this match, Argentina looked to continue this trend. They looked to exploit Höwedes, again a right-footed centre back with his club, and were able to do so from time to time.

Though they too attacked down the right, Argentina’s attacks were different in the fact that they were mostly on counter-attacks. Lavezzi was able to break quickly twice early on and drew a yellow card for Bastian Schweinsteiger. Messi, too, drifted into the wide right area and, as mentioned above, he was able to beat Hummels for pace when he did move wide, with Höwedes occupied by Lavezzi.

Certainly the best chance for Argentina fell to Higuain, when Toni Kroos headed a ball back intended for Neuer only for it to fall to the Argentinian striker, but he shot wide. He had another chance, that he scored, but was rightfully called offside after Messi played a ball out to Lavezzi on the right, who then whipped a ball in behind the German defense for Higuain to finish. Unfortunately for Argentina, he went too early. Messi had a chance in the second half that he shot wide as well. The best chance in extra time came to Palacio, who tried to chip Neuer, only for the ball to go wide.

Changes

Sabella made the first move, bringing on Aguero for Lavezzi at half time. It was an odd choice, considering Argentina were allowing Germany to play in the wide areas, they needed defensive work rate from the wide players in tracking the German full backs, something that Aguero isn’t particularly known for. It was also odd considering Lavezzi was causing Germany problems when he was able to dribble at them with pace.

Regardless, the substitution changed Argentina’s shape from a 4-4-1-1 to a 4-4-2 with a diamond midfield. Aguero and Higuain were up top, with Messi behind them. With little pace in the wide areas, where Argentina caused Germany the most problems, it allowed Hummels and Boateng a much easier time of reading where the ball was going to be played and allowed them to step in front of Higuain and Aguero and win the ball back.

Löw had to bring on Schürrle for Kramer in the first half which pushed Özil into a number 10 role and forced Kroos to drop a bit deeper positionally, which made Germany much more of a 4-2-3-1 rather than a 4-3-3.

Later in the match, Sabella replaced Higuain with Palacio and then Perez with Gago. As mentioned above, Palacio, with fresh legs, had Argentina’s best chance in extra time. The same can be said about Germany as Götze had the best chance for the winners, scoring the winning goal on that chance.

Conclusion

People will criticise Messi for his performance, but a lot of his lack of influence on the game was the result of Schweinsteiger’s good play, making Messi uncomfortable in the space just in front of the Germany back four. It pushed Messi wide and he, and Argentina, found some space, but he was relatively muted for large periods of the match.

Germany were the best team throughout the tournament and there has been a lot said about how their performance embodied the idea of a football as a team sport. Kroos was arguably their best player in many of their matches, but in the final, when his performance slipped a bit, Schweinsteiger put in his best performance.

Germany’s decision to change their approach to youth development and style over the last fifteen years paid off with a World Cup win and it could spark a German dominance in the next few years.